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INTERROGATION OF JURORS AS TO CONNECTIONS
WITH INSURANCE COMPANIES
Prior to the trial of a personal injury suit the plaintiff submitted an affidavit
to the court stating that he had "reasonable grounds for believing" that persons
having some relationship to the insurance company interested in the defense
might be among the panel of jurors selected for service in the case. The plaintiff
requested permission to interrogate the jurors on voir dire concerning possible
interests in the company. The court granted this request and approved the
questioning of the jurors as to any relationships which they, or their friends and
relatives, might have with a "company that makes a practice of investigating or
defending cases of this kind." On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court held that
permitting this questioning was erroneous, since the affidavit did not establish
that the inquiry was made in good faith and not for the purpose of suggesting to
the jury that an insurance company was involved in the action. Wheeler v.
Rudek.'
Within the past ten years, the Illinois Supreme Court has taken several conflicting positions regarding the circumstances under which prospective jurors
may be questioned about possible relationships with insurance companies.2 The
Wheeler case, in effect, overruled two cases in which, on the basis of substantially
similar affidavits, the plaintiffs were permitted to inquire about jurors' insurance connections.3 But in the period between those decisions the court had
blocked such an inquiry where the interested insurance company submitted an
affidavit that none of the persons on the jury list had any connection with it.4
These affidavits by the insurers do not, of course, protect the plaintiffs against
the possibility that the jury may include friends and relatives of those who have
a direct connection with the company.
The Wheeler case has now placed an even greater restriction on the voir dire
examination. The effect of the decision is to preclude an inquiry about insurance
connections except where the plaintiff has actual knowledge that a prospective
juror has some connection with the insurance company or individuals interested
in the company. Since ordinarily a plaintiff will not be familiar with the interests of the jury panel, the decision seems to foreclose questioning along this line
except in those unusual instances where the plaintiff obtains the required information prior to the voir dire either by chance or through personal investigation.
While most courts do not allow the introduction of information that the de'397 Ii. 438, 74 N.E. 2d 6oi (1947).

2Questions concerning relationships with insurance companies need not, as in fact the
questions asked in the Wheeler case did not, actually mention the words "insurance company."
For convenience this note has not ittempted to distinguish the various ways in which the
question is propounded.
3 Moore v. Edmonds, 384 Ill. 535, 52 N.E. 2d 216 (1943); Smithers v. Henriquez, 368 Ill.
588, x5 N.E. 2d 499 (1938).
4Kavanaugh v. Parret, 379 Ill. 273, 4o N.E. 2d 500 (1942); cf. Edwards v. Hill-Thomas
Lime & Cement Co., 378 Ml. 18o,37 N.E. 2d 8oi (1941).
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fendant carries liability insurance on the ground of irrelevancy and prejudice to
the defendant,5 they do permit plaintiffs to ascertain relationships between possible jurors and insurance companies which may be cause for bias.6 Nearly all
courts allow the plaintiff to pursue some form of inquiry on voir dire directed
at exposing these relationships, provided the inquiry is conducted in "good
faith."7 There is, however, little agreement as to what constitutes good faith.
In some jurisdictions, questions regarding possible connections with insurance
companies have been allowed even when the liability was not insured, on the
ground that such questions were required to determine whether the jurors were
defense-minded. 8 At the other extreme are those courts which adopt the approach taken in the Wheeler case.9 In most jurisdictions, once it is established
that the defendant is insured, courts will permit an inquiry as to insurance connections unless there is some indication that the inquiry is designed to inform
the jury that the defendant is insured against liability.1o The application of this
5 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 282a (1940). Two states permit joinder of the insurance company as a party defendant. Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § 26o.11; La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart,
1939) § 4248. Texas courts will permit joinder only when the insurance policy benefits the
injured party as well as the insured. American Indemnity Co. v. Martin, 54 S.W. 2d 542 (Tex.
Civ. App., 1932); Texas Landscape Co. v. Longoria, 30 S.W. 2d 423 (Tex. Civ. App., 1930);
see 20 Corn. L.Q. 0io(1934), noting Vega v. Evans, 128 Ohio 535, 191 N.E. 757 (1934).
6Courts confront somewhat similar problems in connection with the right of the plaintiff
to question witnesses as to their interest or bias. See 3 Wigmore, Evidence § 969 (94o). Where
the relationship of the witness to the interested insurance company is such that his testimony
may be affected, many courts have permitted the relationship to be disclosed even though the
jury is thereby informed about the insurance company. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 282a (294o).
As a practical matter, defendants rarely introduce witnesses who might reveal that the defendant is insured.
7 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 282a (94o) and cases cited; 9 Blashfield, Automobile Law and
Practice § 6296 (,935).
8Silvestro v. Walz, 222 Ind. 163, 51 N.E. 2d 629 (1943); cf. Roselle v. Beach, 51 Cal. App.
2d 579, 125 P. 2d 77 (942); Shams v. Saportas, 152 Fla. 48, 10 So. 2d 715 (1942); Hedgecock
v. Orloskey, iio Ind. App. 504,39 N.E. 2d 452 (1942).
9The Kentucky courts are in accord. Ewing-Von Allmen Dairy Co. v. Godwin, 304 Ky.
161, 200 S.W. 2d 1o3 (947); Duncan Coal Co. v. Thompson's Adm'r, 157 Ky. 304, 162 S.W.

139 (1914).
oWhite v. Teague, 353 Mo. 247,

182 S.W. 2d 288 ('944); Edwards v. Quackenbush, 112
Colo. 337, 149 P. 2d 809 (1944); Olguin v. Thygesen, 47 N.M. 377, 243 P. 2d 585 (1943);
Heinrich v. Ellis, 113 Ind. App. 478, 48 N.E. 2d 96 (i943); Popoff v. Mott, 14 Wash. 2d i,
126 P. 2d 597 (1942).

To come within the scope of the good faith doctrine it has been said that counsel must word
his questions so that they will include only such facts as are reasonably necessary to discover

the desired information. Jones v. Bayley, 49 Cal. App. 2d 647, 122 P. 2d 293-(4942); Fais v.
Burroughs Adding Machine Co., 48 Idaho 310, 282 Pac. 72 (1929); Daniel v..Asbill, 97 Cal.
App. 731, 276 Pac. 149 (1929). Remarks made by counsel within the hearing of the jury
stating that the defendant is insured axe indicative of bad faith. Curtis v. McAuliffe, io6 Cal.App. i, 288 Pac. 675 (1930); Spinney's Adm'x v. Hooker & Son, 9 2 Vt. 146, 102 Atl. 53 (1917)
Nor is it good faith to propound such interrogatories where the proceedings are held in a small
town and counsel is familiar with the occupations and interests of the jurors. Ryan v. Si meons,
209 Iowa 1oo, 229 N.W. 667 (1930); cf. Miller v. Kooker, 208 Iowa 687,'224 N.W.'46"(x929)
Contra: Eagen v. O'Malley, 45 Wyo. 505, 21 P. 2d 821 (1933); Ulmer v. Farnham, 28-S.W. 2d
113 (Mo. App., 1930).
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criterion to particular cases involves the difficult task of determining the plaintiff's motivation.
It is questionable whether denying the plaintiff the privilege of inquiring
about insurance connections would jeopardize his right to an impartial jury.,,
The questions usually asked of prospective jurors will reveal their occupations
as well as those of immediate relatives and close friends; moreover, counsel may
ascertain stock holdings of the jurors and even of friends and relatives without
asking the questions prohilited in the Wheeler case. There are, however, some
relationships, difficult to specify, which will be known to the juror but which
cannot be exposed without unduly long questioning unless there is some reference to insurance connections. It seems unlikely that relationships with individuals who are connected with insurance companies other than the one in suit will
be a source of partisanship. The juror will probably not anticipate that a verdict
for the plaintiff will have an impact on the interests of his friends and relatives
because their interests will appear remote from the imposition of liability on the
insurance company concerned in the suit.I2 This will certainly be true in those
cases where the juror is not aware that the liability is insured unless it is assumed that the unexposed connection would tend to make the juror defenseminded. One may doubt, however, whether a relationship that is so distant that
it is not exposed on the voir dire will operate to influence the juror's verdict.
The undisclosed relationships that may generate prejudice are those between
the prospective juror and distant relations or acquaintances who may be stockholders, officers, supervisory employees, or agents and brokers of the interested
company.' 3 Each of these does have some personal interest in the company's
finances. Here again the distance of relationship will operate to lessen its influence on the verdict. But even if there are more immediate relationships which
will not be disclosed, it should be observed that only a relatively small number
of individuals connected with any one liability company will be eligible for jury
service within a county; thus there is but small chance that a friend or relative
who favors a particular company will become a member of a jury in a case
involving that company.
On the other hand, the probability is significantly greater that questions suggesting the interest of the insurance company-even if the use of the word "insurance" is avoided-will lead the jury to believe that an indemnity company
will bear the ultimate liability. The jurors, knowing that not all persons carry
liability insurance, would reasonably have doubts as to whether the defendant
"See Goldstein, Trial Technique § 252 (1935).
' Whether a juror who is connected with another liability company will be defense-minded
is arguable. The existence of competition between casualty companies would suggest that one
would not be anxious to benefit another. On the other hand, every liability company does
have some interest in discouraging personal injury suits.
13 Although even these relationships could theoretically be exposed by a sufficiently extended interrogation on voir dire, it is questionable whether such an interrogation would be feasible
or permitted.
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is insured.4 These doubts might well be resolved by questions relating to insurance connections.
Narrowly restricting the voir dire inquiry, as did the Wheeler case, does not
adequately solve the problem. While there remains a possibility that one of the
jurors may be biased in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's right to a fair
trial is, to that extent, imperiled. The solution offered by the Wheeler case may,
in addition, lead to other undesirable consequences. It may induce plaintiffs to
approach prospective jurors before the voir dire in order to gain information
that will bring them within the "good faith" requirement suggested in the case;
it may also unduly prolong the voir dire examination.
A more satisfactory solution would be found in legislation authorizing the
addition of a question on the form questionnaire which jurors are at present
required to answer, concerning their relationships, direct and indirect, with insuirance companies.'s Such legislation might also permit counsel to challenge
jurors for cause on the basis of information disclosed in the questionnaire.'"

THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AS AFFECTED
BY THIRD PARTY'S PRESENCE
The only evidence offered in support of a claim against a decedent's estate
was the testimony of an attorney who had represented the decedent for eleven
years prior to her death. Over objection, he was permitted to testify that the
decedent had said to the claimant in his presence, "You are going to get your
$5,ooo, don't worry about it,... it will be paid as soon as 'The Elms' [a part
of the decedent's husband's estate] are sold," and also that the decedent had
24 The Chicago Motor Club estimates that 75 to 8o per cent of the motorists in the state
of Illinois carry liability insurance. Private communication from Mr. A. Ulrich, Jr., Underwriter, The Inter-Insurance Exchange of the Chicago Motor Club (February 4, 1948).
s Compare 43 Mich. L. Rev. 621 (1444), noting Moore v. Edmonds, 384 Ill. 535, 52 N.E.
2d 26 (1943). Individuals eligible for jury service are required to answer the questionnaire
at the time they are placed on the jury list. Its contents are governed by statute. Ill. Rev.
Stat. (1947) c. 78, § 25. Since there may be a considerable lapse of time between the date when
the questionnaire is answered and the date when jury service begins, it would be advisable for
the legislation to provide for additional questioning at the commencement of the juror's
service as to changes in his interests.
6 While each counsel is now permitted five peremptory challenges where there are only
two record parties to the litigation, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 110, § 19o, the plaintiff will be
afforded much greater protection if, in addition, he can automatically exclude from jury
service those who might be biased in favor of the insurance company. A New York statute
makes an interest in any liability insurance company a ground for challenge in personal injury
suits. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Cahill-Parsons, 1946) § 452. In Illinois a juror's connection with
the defendant's insurer is probably a ground for challenge for cause. See Smithers v. Henriquez, 287 Ill. App. 95, 4 N.E. 2d 793 (1936). In other jurisdictions it has been held that a
direct connection with an insurance company other than the one in suit is not a ground for
challenge for cause. Anderson v. Todd Shipyard Corp., 63 F. Supp. 229 (N.Y., 1945); see
Vega v. Evans, X28 Ohio 535, 191 N.E. 757 (1934); Mortrude v. Martin, i85 Iowa 1319, r72
N.W. 17 (i919). This question has not arisen in Illinois.

